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COMPULSORY PRE-TRIAL PHYSICAL EXAMINATION
OF PLAINTIFF IN PERSONAL INJURY SUITS
John Smith, alleging permanent injuries to his spine as the result of a collision
caused by the negligence of a motorman employed by the X Street Railroad Co.,
sues the Company for $25,000 damages. Smith, of course, will use the expert
testimony of his own physicians at the trial. The defendant, in order to check
on the nature, extent and permanency of the injuries and to enable it to properly
defend, requests Smith to submit to a pre-trial physical examination by defend-
ant's physicians. If Smith complies with the request, well and good. But if he
refuses, does the trial court, on proper motion of defendant, have power to issue
an order against Smith to submit to such a pre-trial examination? If so, under
what conditions will the power be exercised? How may the court enforce the
order?
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Do trial courts have this power? Today, the answer is "yes," in the great
majority of states, including Pennsylvania,' and since 1938, in the federal district
courts. 2 The method of enforcement is by staying the proceedings until the plain-
tiff complies, or by dismissing the case altogether. In Pennsylvania, the trial courts
have long asserted the existence of the power and have exercised it in proper cases.
But in the federal courts, the existence of the power was denied for forty-seven
years, and it was not until the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Proced-"
ure3 in 1938 that the federal courts stepped into line.
The purpose of this article is to examine the arguments for and against the
existence of the power of a trial court to order a pre-trial physical examination of
plaintiff in personal injury actions; to note briefly the common law analogies, if
any; and to set forth the practical application of this power by the trial courts of
Pennsylvania.
I PUBLIC POLICY AND COMMON LAW ANALOGIES
Our plaintiff, John Smith, has alleged permanent spinal injuries, and will
offer the expert testimony of his physicians to support the claim. The jury will
sympathize with the crippled plaintiff and will be impressed by the testimony of
the experts. How can the Railway Company properly defend the action? It can-
not, unless it can in some way secure an examination of Smith by its own physi-
cians, thereby qualifying them to testify.
Fairness demands that the defendant be entitled to discover the nature and
extent of plaintiff's injuries. Justice insists that all material facts be presented to
th- jury; otherwise a thorough search for the truth is impossible, with a vital ave-
nue to the disclosure of important facts closed by a court-made barrier. If the
court refuses to order such an examination, justice will be denied the defendant;
the court will have robbed the jury of its opportunity, and rendered impossible
the performance of the jury's duty, of hearing and weighing all relevant facts; and
the portals of the halls of justice will be opened wide to plaintiffs with fraudulent
or exaggerated claims. Is it the function of courts to deny justice to defendants,
to suppress important facts, to encourage exaggerated or downright fraudulent
claims? Of course not. A wise public policy has always demanded that trial
courts compel pre-trial physical examination of a plaintiff in personal injury ac-
tions. Most state courts have consistently followed this policy. Yet for forty-
seven years the United States Supreme Court denied not only the power, but also
the wisdom of such a practice!
117 AM. JUR. sec. 55 et. seq.; 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940), sec. 2220, n.
13; and see 63 U. OF PA. L. REV. 207, 84 U. oF PA. L. REv. 1001.
228 U.S.C.A. following sec. 723c.
81bid,
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At common law, there is no recorded decision asserting or denying the exist-
ence of the power. However, in analogous cases, the courts uniformly asserted
and exercised the power to order a physical examination whenever fairness, truth
and justice required.
The writ de venhre inspeciendo was a writ to inspect the body of a widow sus-
pected of feigning herself with child in order to produce a suppositious heir to
her deceased husband's estate, thus defrauding the rightful heirs or devisees. The
writ directed that, in the presence of knights and women, the widow be examined.
The writ is ". . . a proceeding at common law, where a widow is
suspected to feign herself with child, in order to produce a supposi-
tious heir to the estate . . . In this case with us, the heir-presumptive
may have a writ de ventre inspeciendo to examine whether she' be
with child, or not; and if she be, to keep her under proper restraint
till delivered."
4
This writ also lay where a woman sentenced to death pleaded pregnancy.5
Physical examination by court order was also provided for in the appeal
of mayhem.
"In an appeal of mayhem, the court may at the prayer of the defend-
ant, try, upon inspection of the part, whether there be a mayhem...
If the court, upon inspecting the part in an appeal of mayhem, be
doubtful whether there be a mayhem, a writ may be awarded to
the sheriff, to return some able physicians and surgeons for the better
information of the court."
6
Also, in a divorce proceeding where impotency was charged, the court had
no hesitation in arriving at the truth by ordering a physical examination of one
or both parties.
"Whenever the present condition of the sexual organs is an essen-
tial element in the proofs, the court orders what is termed an inspec-
tion of the person by medical experts. Acting under oath as quasi
officers of the court, their duty is to examine the private parts of the
parties, and report whether or not they are severally capable of mar-
riage consummation, and whether or not the woman presents indi-
cations of having had connection with man.
"The parts concerned being concealed from public observation, if
inspection could not be compelled, justice would in many instances
Jail. . . Therefore in England, Scotland, France, and probably evey
other country in which this impediment to marriage is acknowledge
the courts have required the parties, when the exigencies of the




GBacon, ABRIDGEMENT (1736). Amer. ed. 1854, v. 9, p. 554, as cited in 8 WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE (31d ed. 1940) p. 86, n. 2.
12 BISHOP ON MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION (1891), sec. 1298-99.
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These three examples of the exercise by the old English courts of a power
analogous to that of requiring a plaintiff alleging personal injuries to submit to a
physical examination, are highly important for this reason: they indicate the readi-
ness and willingness of the common law courts to order the physical examination
of a person whenever fair play and the interests of truth and justice dictated. The
demands of truth and justice are every bit as compelling in a personal injury ac-
tion as they were in the three common law situations cited. But when, in each
state, worried defendants began to ask the court to order an examination of the
plaintiff, the results were conflicting. Some jurisdictions answered the demands
of public policy, recognized the common law analogies, and asserted the power.
Others, while conceding the need for such a power, failed to find it in the absence
of statute. And thr United States Supreme Court not only denied the power, but,
ignoring the plight of the defendant without a defense and the demands of fair-
ness and justice for a thorough search for the truth, went on to say that its exer-
cise would result in an unjust deprivation of the plaintiff's sacred right of immu-
nity of his person!8 In these three ways did our courts meet the challenge of a
problem that was new in detail but old and well-settled in principle.9
II THE EXISTENCE OF THE POWER
(1) In the Federal Courts
In 1891, in the leading case of Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford,1 the ma-
jority, speaking through Justice Gray, affirmed the holding of the Circuit Court
that it had no legal right or power to make or enforce an order requiring plaintiff
to submit to a pre-trial physical examination. The inviolability of one's person is
far too sacred a right to permit such an invasion, said the court.
"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law . . .
The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compulsory
stripping and exposure as by a blow. To compel anyone, and es-
pecially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit it to the touch of
a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault and
a trespass."
That this right cannot be violated "without lawful authority" is obviously
true. But the court is begging the question: if it should hold that it has such a
power, the violation of the person is then made, ipso facto, with the authority of
law, and hence is not a trespass. Furthermore, one's right to freedom from touch-
8Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 35 L. ed. 734, 11 S. Ct. 1000 (1890).
9
An analysis of these conflicting decisions, state by state, is beyond the scope of this article.
For an excellent discussion of the early development of the law on this subject in the United
States, see article by Shastid in 1 MicH. L. Rsv. 193, 277.
10141 U.S. 250, 35 L. ed. 734, 11 S. Ct. 1000 (1890).
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ing is not an absolute unqualified right; in self-defense, or in defense of one's
property, for example, another can violate that sacred right even to the point of
killing.
Further, said the court, there is no legal precedent for the existence of such a
power, therefor it does not exist. The court dismissed the analogy of the bill of
divorce charging impotency, in two ways: first, by pointing out that the examina-
tion for impotency is derived from the civil and canon law, as administered in
spiritual and ecclesiastical courts, and not from the common law; second, by as-
serting that in divorce cases the public, as well as the parties, had an interest. But
conceding that the public has an interest in the upholding or dissolution of the
marriage relation, is not the public's interest in encouraging disclosure of the truth
and in barring fraud from the courts of justice just as great?
As for the writ de ventre inspeciendo, the court recognized the analogy but
refused to apply it, saying that the writ was a child of ancient days and no longer
in use. It would seem, however, that the passing away of conditions requiring the
use of the writ bears no relation whatsoever to the really important question: did
the common law, in proper cases, assert a power to order a physical examination?
The foundation of the power is the difficulty of reaching the truth in any other
way than by an examination of the person. At common law, wherever this founda-
tion existed, the power was asserted and exercised. The question of the existence
of power to order examination of a plaintiff in a personal injury case is merely a
modern variation of a fundamental problem. The fact that an earlier variation of
this fundamental problem no longer exists proves nothing. It is the principle, not
the existence or non-existence of a particular application of the principle, that is
important. A dead limb does not prove that the tree is dead.
The defendant will be adequately protected, the court continued, because the
jury may infer from plaintiff's refusal to be examined that such examination will
be prejudicial to his claim. Protection by inference offers poor consolation to a
defendant who really needs positive evidence to properly defend. The jury may
draw an inference, and again it may not. To deprive a party of the opportunity to
obtain positive evidence, and then to tell him he will be protected by whatever
inferences the jury cares to draw, is one for the cold comfort department.
The court noted that several state courts, particularly in the West and the
South," had asserted the power to grant such an order. The rule in Indiana,
where the Circuit Court which had refused to grant the order was sitting, was
unsettled, but even if Indiana had clearly asserted the power it would have made
no difference, because, said the court, "this is not a question which is governed by
the laws or practice of the state in which the trial is had. It depends upon the
power of the National Courts under the Constitution and laws of the United
States."
llowa, Ohio, Kansas, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska, Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, Georgia
and Alabama were mentioned by the court.
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A strong dissent was registered by Justice Brewer, Justice Brown concurring.
Justice Brewer, balancing the right of personal inviolability of the plaintiff against
the claims of truth and justice, found the scales tipped by the latter. He said:
"The end of litigation is justice. Knowledge of the truth is essen-
tial thereto ... It seems strange that a plaintiff may, in the presence
of a jury, be permitted to roll up his sleeve and disclose on his arm
a wound of which he testifies; but when he testifies as to the exis-
tence of such a wound, the court, though persuaded that he is per-
juring himself, cannot require him to roll up his sleeve, and thus
make manifest the truth, nor require him in the like interest of truth,
to step into an adjoining room, and lay bare his arm to the inspection
of surgeons. It is said that there is a sanctity of the person which
may not be outraged. We believe that truth and justice are more
sacred than any personal consideration."
As to the enforcement of such an order, Justice Brewer suggests that it be
enforced not by contempt proceedings against a disobedient plaintiff, but by stay-
ing or dismissing the case. Looking backward, one sees that while Justice Brewer
lost the battle, he won the war, for his dissenting view has been followed in the
great majority of state courts, and in 1938 it became the rule in the United States
district courts, by virtue of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 2 His suggested
method of enforcement-by staying or dismissing, and not by contempt-has also
been followed, universally. 18
Justice Brewer was not the first to present these common sense views. In 1879,
fourteen years before the Botsford decision, the highest court of Iowa, in reversing
the trial court for refusing to comply with defendant's request for an order upon
plaintiff to submit himself for examination, answered in advance all of Justice
Gray's arguments against the existence of the power:
"The plaintiff, as it were, had under his own control testimony which
would have revealed the truth more clearly than any other that could
have been introduced. The cause of truth, the right administration
of the law, demand that he should have produced it."
On the invasion of plaintiff's sacred immunity from unconsented touching:
"As to indignity . . . it is probably more imaginary than
real. An examination of the person is not so regarded when made
for the purpose of administering remedies. Those who effect in-
surance upon their lives, pensioners for disability incurred in the
military service of the country, soldiers and sailors enlisting in the
army and navy, all are subjected to rigid examination of their bodies,
and it is never esteemed a dishonor or indignity."
And on the plight of the defendant if no such order can be made:
"The defendant is left to depend upon the inference of the jury,
which might or might not have been exercised, instead of having the
1228 U.S.C.A. following sec. 723c.
18For Pennsylvania cases, see notes 34 and 35.
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truth disclosed by direct and positive evidence. The law will not re-
quire it to depend upon such inference when it can afford the means
of producing competent evidence upon the question in issue."
1 4
The exalted perch erected by the Botsford case for a plaintiff's delicate feel-
ings was gradually lowered by later federal decisions. Where the state in which
the federal court sits has an enabling statute authorizing the state courts to direct
an examination, the federal court must comply with the state statute, in accordance
with the terms of R. S. 721.16 This was decided in the case of Camden & Suburban
Ry Co. v. Stetson.' The court reaffirmed the holding in the Botsford case where
there is no enabling statute. In the Stetson case, the court distinguished the Bots-
ford case by saying that in the latter case there was no statute of the state, and no
intimation in the opinion that such a statute would violate the United States Con-
stitution or be invalid for any other reason. On this latter point there is room for
debate. In the Botsford decision, Justice Gray had said, without reservation, that,
"this is not a question which is governed by the laws or practice of the state in
which the trial is had. It depends upon the power of the National Court under
the Constitution and laws of the United States." Furthermore, he had hinted that
such a practice would be unconstitutional. A later federal case17 states expressly
that one of the reasons for the Botsford decision was the unconstitutionality of any
assertion by the federal courts of the power to compel plaintiff to be examined, and
that the Stetson decision therefore overrules that portion of the Botsford decision.' 8
Whether the one case partially overruled the other, or whether the two are
distinguishable, is of only academic interest here. The important point is, a wedge
was driven into the Botsford decision, the size of the hole depending upon the
number of states with enabling statutes.' 9
A second limitation of the Botsford decision was soon made. Where plain-
tiff voluntarily exhibits his injuries to the jury, he thereby waives his immunity
from being examined, and defendant is entitled to require him to submit to an
examination, the court having power so to order independent of any statute.'
0
Judge Amidon remarks that the Botsford decision is at variance with a large ma-
jority of state courts, and that "we do not feel, therefore, disposed to extend the
decision beyond the facts there involved."
1
4 Schroeder v. The C.R.I. & P.R. Co., 47 Iowa 375 (1877).
1528 U.S.C.A. sec. 725. "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution,
treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules
of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply.-
16177 U.S. 172, 44 L. ed. 721, 20 S. Ct. 617 (1900).
17 Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Tendall, 167 F. 62 (1909).
lsThe holding in the Botsford case is not clear on the constitutional point. After hinting
that the assertion and exercise of power to compel plaintiff to be examined would be uncon-
stitutional, Justice Gray immediately contradicts himself by implying that a United States statute
authorizing such an order would be valid.
19 Less than one-fourth of the states have such statutes. Pennsylvania has no such statute.
For listing, see 8 WIGMoRE oN EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940), sec. 2220, n. 13.
sOChicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Tendall, 167 F. 62 (1909).
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Thus hardly had the Botsford decision been delivered, when federal judges
indicated their dissatisfaction with the views of Justice Gray by refusing to extend
them and by actually whittling away part of the original doctrine. But the federal
district courts, of course, were obligated to refuse to order a physical examination
of plaintiff in cases arising in states where there was no enabling statute or where
plaintiff did not first voluntarily exhibit his injures to the jury. That a note of
dissatisfaction sometimes appeared is shown in Brace v. Central R. Co. 2 1 Though
duty-bound to deny the defendant's motion, because the court was sitting in Penn-
sylvania where there was no enabling statute, Judge Whitmer openly admired the
sound reasoning of two Pennsylvania trial courts in asserting and exercising the
power.
22
It was not until 1938, however, that the federal courts stepped into line. In
that year, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective.23 The new rules
were promulgated by the United States Supreme Court pursuant to authority con-
ferred by the Act of June 19, 1934.24 The notes of the Commissioners indicate
that Rule 35 (a) is intended to overrule the Botsford decision. Rule 35 (a) is
as follows:
"In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party
is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order
him to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician.
The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and
upon notice to the party to be examined and to all other parties and
shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the
examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made."
Enforcement of the order is provided for in Rule 37 (b) (2). Note that
the Rule expressly forbids enforcement by a contempt order against plaintiff.
Three means of enforcement are provided:
1. An order that the physical condition shall be taken to be estab-
lished in accord with the claims of defendant.
2. An order refusing to allow plaintiff to introduce evidence of
physical condition.
3. An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying pro-
ceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or
any part thereof, or rendering a judgment against plaintiff.
4. "In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an
order directing the arrest of any party or agent of a party for
disobeying any of such orders except an order to submit to a
physical or mental examination." (Italics supplied.)
21216 F. 718 (1914).
22 Hess v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 7 C.C. 565 (1890); 34 W.N.C, 295.
2828 U.S.C.A. following sec. 723C.
2428 U.S.C.A. sec. 723b.
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Final victory awaited a test in the United States Supreme Court. That test
came with the case of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 5 and Rule 35 (a) squeezed
through to a five-to-four victory.
The facts are as follows: Plaintiff had sued in the Federal District Court for
Northern Illinois for automobile injuries sustained in Indiana. The district court
ordered plaintiff to submit to examination under Rule 35 (a), and upon his re-
fusal found him guilty of contempt of court. The contempt proceedings were in
palpable violation of Rule 37 (b) (2), and it was on this ground that the Supreme
Court eventually reversed. But plaintiff did not appeal on this ground. He ap-
pealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals on the ground that Rule 35 (a), authorizing
the examination order, was invalid. He argued that the enabling act of 1934 au-
thorized only procedural changes, and that Rule 35 (a) permits the invasion of a
substantive right and is therefore invalid. To sustain his argument that plaintiff's
right of personal immunity is a substantive right, plaintiff relied heavily on the
Botsford decision. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that Rule 35 (a) changed
the rule of the Botsford case, and that the change was one of procedure. The
Court said:
,, regardless of prior court decisions holding to the contrary, both
the Supreme Court and Congress [by approving the Rules, which
had been prepared with the assistance of an Advisory Committee of
legal experts after two and one-half years' work] have construed the
right as not being substantive as that term was used in the Enabling
Act."26
Plaintiff then brought certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Justice
Roberts, for the majority, affirmed the holding of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The rule is procedural, not substantive, he said, and pointed out that even the
Botsford case admitted this by acknowledging that a United States statute author-
izing such an order would be valid.
Four justices dissented, however, with Justice Frankfurter writing the dis-
senting opinion (Justices Black, Murphy and Douglas concurring):
"So far as national law is concerned, a drastic change in public policy
in a matter deeply touching the sensibilities of people or even their
prejudices as to privacy, ought not to be inferred from a general
authority to formulate rules for the uniform and effective dispatch
of business on the civil side of the federal courts . . . That disobed-
ience of an order under Rule 35 cannot be visited with punishment
as for contempt does not mitigate its intrusion into an historic im-
munity of the privacy of the person."2 7
25312 U.S. 1, 85 L. ed. 479, 61 S. Ct. 422 (1941).
26108 E. (2d) 415 (1939).
27312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
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All nine justices agreed in reversing the lower courts on the ground that the
order was improperly enforced by a contempt order, in direct violation of the
terms of Rule 37 (b) (2).
Whether Rule 35 (a) is procedural or substantive is not within the purview
of this article. Suffice it to say here that one not in sympathy with the dispro-
portionate emphasis of the Botsford decision upon the "sacred" immunity of the
plaintiff's person, even at the expense of the proper administration of justice and
of the suppression of important facts, will applaud Rule 35 and will welcome the
decision of the majority in upholding the validity of the Rule.
(2) IN THE PENNSYLVANIA COURTS
The tortuous path trod by the Federal courts was successfully by-passed by the
Pennsylvania courts. As in most states, it has long been settled in Pennsylvania
that a trial court has inherent power to order the plaintiff to submit to a physical
examination.
Even before the Botsford case, our lower courts asserted and exercised the
power. In Lawrencie v. Keim,28 the court said it had no doubt of its power to
make such an order, either before or at the trial, when it appeared to be necessary
for a fair and intelligent investigation of the case. However, the court failed to
discuss the basis or origin of the power. An order without comment was also
issued in Harvey v. Philadelphia Transit Co.29
The bases of the power were explored by President Judge Gunnison in the
case of Hess v. Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co.80 Ignoring completely the idea of the
inviolability of plaintiff's person, the judge found an analogy in the power to in-
directly compel a party to produce for inspection writings which the adverse party
conceives to be material, by continuing the trial until inspection is allowed. Fur-
thermore, justice demands such a power to order a physical examination: other-
wise, a defendant cannot defend a case brought against him "by an unprincipled
adventurer whose claim has no merit." No harm can befall a plaintiff with a
meritorious claim. Then he adds:
"Impartial justice could not be expected in such cases (that is, if the
order is not granted) at the hands of juries, who were not permitted
to know the truth, and whose sympathies were aroused by the reci-
tations of sufferings which could not be controverted . .. To permit
such a practice would be to encourage perjury and properly subject
courts of justice to public contempt."
2819 Phila. 351 (1888).
2926 W.N.C. 231 (1890).
807 C.C. 565 (1890).
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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
In another case,31 the trial judge relied partly upon the analogy of the writ
de ventre inspeciendo, and stresses that without such a physical examination any
defense to an alleged injury such as the notorious "Railway Spine" would be hope-
less. The court mentions the Botsford decision only to ignore it.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has never had occasion to decide directly
the precise question of the existence of the power. But almost as decisive is the
fact that in at least three cases it has assumed that the trial court possessed such
power. In Cohen v. Phila. Transit Co.,32 defendant appealed from a judgment
for plaintiff after the lower court in the exercise of its discretion had refused to
grant an order for a physical examination in view of the fact that the plaintiff had
already voluntarily submitted to several examinations by the defendant's physicians.
Said Justice Moschzisker, in holding that the lower court had not abused its dis-
cretion:
"We entertain no doubt of the right of a court, when one sues for
alleged injuries to the person, to afford the defendant a proper op-
portunity to have a physical examination made by skilled medical
men. Of course, the court cannot order a plaintiff to submit to such
an ordeal against his will, but it can, and, when the ends of justice
so require, should refuse to permit the case to proceed until the plain-
tiff undergoes an examination."I s
III THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER IN PENNSYLVANIA
The defendant has no absolute right to an order from the trial court directing
the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination; granting or refusing the order is
in the sound discretion of the trial court,84 and the appellate court will reverse only
for abuse of discretion. There have been no reversals on this ground in Penn-
sylvania.
How is the order enforced? If plaintiff refuses to obey, the court will stay
the proceedings until he complies,", or will dismiss the case;s6 but his refusal is
never treated as a contempt,'one court saying that it is not necessary to resort to
such an extreme measure.81 Usually, the court merely refuses to proceed with the
case until plaintiff obeys. But in Heilig v. Harrisburg Rys. Co.38 the case was
dismissed. There, plaintiff had alleged that the nerves controlling his eyesight
were permanently injured to such an extent that within five days after the accident
SlDemenstein v. Richardson, 2 Dist. Rep. 825 (1893).
32250 Pa. 15 (1915); also see Twinn v. Noble, 270 Pa. 500 (1921); and Schroth et ux.
v. Phila. R. T. Co., 280 Pa. 36 (1924).
33250 Pa. 15, 17 (1915).
34Twinn v. Noble, 270 Pa. 500 (1921); Schroth et ux. v. Phila. R.T. Co., 280 Pa. 36
(1924).35 Cohen v. Phila. R. T. Co., 250 Pa. 15 (1915); Hess v. R.R. Co., 7 C.C. 565 (1890).
SIAs in Heilig v. Harrisburg Rys. Co., 17 D. & C. 509 (1932).
31 Hess v. R. R. Co., 7 C.C. 565 (1890).
8817 D, & C. 509 (1932).
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he became totally blind. Plaintiff repeatedly and persistently refused to obey th-!
court order directing him to submit to an examination by defendant's eye special-
ists. After eight months' delay, caused wholly by plaintiff's stubbornness, plain-
tiff died, and his executrix was substituted as party plaintiff. On petition of de-
fendant, the court dismissed the case. Said President Judge Hargest:
"The plaintiff was stubborn and recalcitrant. If the plaintiff were
alive we would be justified in dismissing this proceeding, but owing
to his own obstinancy no examination was made and he died without
preserving any evidence as to the cause of his injury. The defendant
was entitled to have that evidence by a physical examination. It can-
not be secured. No good will come of continuing the case. It would
be an injustice to try it, the plaintiff having himself prevented a rea-
sonable and proper physical examination."
When should defendant request a physical examination order? The request
should be promptly made, and before the case is called for trial. 39 But defendant
will not be barred by laches where he delays his application for over a year, the
delay in the trial having been caused by plaintiff.40  Said the court:
"The defendant may ask for a physical examination at any reason-
able time prior to the trial. If a plaintiff chooses to delay the trial
of his cause for a year, there is no reason why the defendant should
not have the right, before the trial proceeds, to a physical examina-
tion of the plaintiff when permanent injuries are alleged."
To how many examinations of plaintiff is defendant entitled? Usually one
is sufficient, but where advisable and necessary the court will order another. Thus
in Narzisi v. Meyer Dairy Corp.,41 the court ordered a second examination where
two and one-half years had elapsed between the first examination and the time for
trial, and plaintiff had alleged permanent injuries. The court said:
"The power to order an examination is not exhausted by one exam-
ination . . . Where the disease is progressive, or the injuries are al-
leged to be permanent, the defendant ought to have an opportunity
to examine again before trial, where two years and six months have
elapsed since the first examination."
Conversely, where no benefit will accrue from an additional examination, the
court will refuse to order it.42
The examining physicians are usually appointed by defendant, because they
are to be his witnesses in the case, but it is within the power of the court to make
the appointment if it desires to exercise the power. 43 If plaintiff presents a valid
89Narzisi v. Meyer Dairy Corp., 22 D. & C. 258 (1933).
40Heilig v. Harrisburg Rys. Co., 17 D. & C. 509 (1932).
4122 D. & C. 258 (1933).
42Cohen v. Phila. R. T. Co., 250 Pa. 15 (1915); Twinn v. Noble, 270 Pa. 500 (1913);
Schroth et ux. Y. Phila. R. T. Co., 280 Pa. 36 (1924).
48Supra, n. 38.
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objection to the doctor or doctors selected, the court will require defendant to name
one suitable to plaintiff, or the court itself will make the appointment. But a
frivolous or petty objection by plaintiff will not be accepted. 44
The number of physicians is usually limited by the court order to two or
thrme.'6 The typical court order directs plaintiff to submit to a physical examin-
ation at such time as plaintiff shall appoint, plaintiff to give reasonable notice of
the time to defendant (sometimes the time is to be determined by agreement of
counsel, and if they fail to agree, by order of court); the examination to be con-
ducted by not more than two (or three) physicians appointed by defendant, in
the presence of both counsel and not more than two (or three) of plaintiff's own
physicians and no one else. The order also contains an admonition to the physicians
and counsel not to ask plaintiff any questions as to the nature and extent of the
injury, except to ask him where he suffered pains so they can locate the injury,
and to ask no questions about the circumstances of the infliction of the injury or
in any way relating to plaintiff's claim.
The examination must be conducted in such a manner as to avoid the inflic-
tion of pain, the subjection to indignity, or the endangering of health or life.",
Loose language has been used in some opinions to the effect that no anesthetics,
opiates or drugs are to be used.417 But this -language is too broad: anesthetics,
opiates or drugs may be employed where required if their use does not cause pain
or endanger life or health. Thus in Heilig v. Harrisburg Rys. Co.,48 defendant's
doctors found it necessary to place in each of plaintiff's eyes three drops of holo-
cain, a local anesthetic, something like a weak solution of cocaine. After the first
drop, plaintiff, complaining of pain, stopped the doctor. The doctor explained
to the court that the "pain" was a little sting, as when a drop of pure water hits
the eye. In holding the use of such an anesthetic proper, the court said:
"In the present case the mild anesth'etic would have prevented pain.
It was necessary to use in order to make the examination which was
required to be made ... It could not have hurt the plaintiff, and
therefore he ought to have submitted himself to what was, in the
development of science, a proper examination."
A realistic test as to the proper use of drugs and anesthetics was set forth and
applied in a Kansas case:
4
"Drugs are of infinite shades of potency from the rankest poison-
ousness to absolute innocuousness ...The question, therefore, is
not if drugs should be used, but if an examination shall be made
without serious inconvenience and without deleterious effect.
441bid.
451bid.; Stasko et ux. v. Smith, 16 D. & C. 726 (1932).
46Hess v. R. R. Co., 7 C.C. 565 (1890).
471bid.
48Heilig v. Harrisburg Rys. Co., 17 D. & C. 509 (1932).
49Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v. Palmore, 68 Kans. 545, 75 Pac. 509 (1904).
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"The conclusion to be drawn from the decisions, therefore, is that
due precautions for the comfort and safety of the subject are the
matters for primary consideration. With these provided for, the
method and means employed should be left to the discretion of the
expert making the examination."
X-ray examinations have been ordered, the court taking judicial notice of the
fact that the X-ray is now in common use and that the science and art thereof have
developed to a point where, in the hands of a specialist, there is little or no dan-
ger.
8 0
The limits beyond which the court will not go in ordering an examination are
illustrated in two cases from other jurisdictions. In one, a Wisconsin case,51 plain-
tiff alleged permanent injuries to her bladder. She submitted to an examination
by defendant's doctors, but refused to permit the introduction of a catheter into
her bladder, on the ground that it would endanger her health. Defendant's doc-
tors testified that their object was to withdraw all the urine from the bladder; that
this was perfectly safe in a healthy bladder, but there were conditions of the blad-
der where this might be absolutely dangerous, causing the walls to come together,
excite inflammation and produce decomposition. The trial court refused to grant
the order. The appellate court affirmed, saying that it would have been an abuse
of discretion to force the plaintiff 'to submit to such an experiment with instru-
ments, under the circumstances stated.
And in a Kentucky case,52 plaintiff, an unmarried girl, alleged internal in-
juries. In objection to defendant's request for a physical examination order, plain-
tiff's physicians told the court that the injury could not be determined objectively
by an examination of her person, except by exploring the vagina and breaking the
hymen, which was then intact, and that an examination could not be made without
injury to her, causing her considerable pain. The order was refused, the appellate
court affirming.
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